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Introduction: Background and Overview of
Child Sexual Abuse
Law Reforms in the Mid-1980's
JOSEPHINE BULKLEY*
The University of Miami Law Review has devoted this issue
to an exploration of the major law reform issues in child sexual
abuse cases in the mid-1980's. The Review chose all except two of
the articles in this issue from papers presented at the recent Na-
tional Policy Conference on Legal Reforms in Child Sexual Abuse
Cases held in March, 1985, by the Child Sexual Abuse Law Reform
Project of the American Bar Association's ("ABA") National Legal
Resource Center for Child Advocacy and Protection. The sympo-
sium was designed as a forum for identifying problems and debat-
ing the benefits and detriments of legal reform efforts in child sex-
ual abuse cases.'
The articles in this issue do not focus solely on identifying and
describing legal reforms in sexual abuse cases, which has been done
in numerous other legal publications.2 Rather, they critically dis-
cuss and analyze recent reforms in order to insure the development
of sound laws and legal policies. Hopefully, this information will
lead to laws and policies that both prevent unnecessary harm to
children and preserve fundamental constitutional guarantees.
0 Project Director, Child Sexual Abuse Law Reform Project, American Bar Association;
B.A., 1972, University of Michigan; J.D., 1978, Antioch School of Law.
1. The ABA published all of the conference papers as a report entitled Papers from a
National Policy Conference on Legal Reforms in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, American Bar
Association, Washington, D.C. (J. Bulkley ed. 1985).
2. See AsmR=c BA AssocIATION, CHILD SExuAL Asus: AND THE LAw (J. Bulkley ed.
1981) [hereinafter cited as CHILD SExuAL ABusE]; INNOVATIONS IN THE PROSECuTION OF CHILD
SExuAL ABuss CASES. AmEmcAN BAR ASSOCIATION (J. Bulkley ed. 1981) (hereinafter cited as
INNOVATIONS]; AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING LEGAL INTER-
VENTION IN INTRAFAMILY CHILD SExuAL Anus: CAsES (J. Bulkley ed. 1982) [hereinafter cited
as RzCOMMENDATIONS]; Ahlgren, Maintaining Incest Victims' Supporting Relationships, 22
J. FAM. L 483 (1983-84); Kirkwood and Mihaila, Incest and the Legal System: Inadequacies
and Alternatives, 12 U.C.D. L. REv. 673 (1979); Libai, The Protection of the Child Victim of
a Sexual Offense in the Criminal Justice System, 15 WAYNE L REV. 977 (1969); Parker,
The Rights of Child Witnesses: Is the Court a Protector or Perpetrator?, 17 NEw ENO. L
REv. 643 (1982); D. Whitcomb, E. Shapiro, & L. Stellwagen, When the Victim Is a Child:
Issues for Judges and Prosecutors, United States Department of Justice, National Institute
of Justice (Aug. 1985).
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These articles suggest that legal reforms should be narrowly drawn
to apply only where clearly necessary. The articles also explore the
potential negative ramifications of the reform ideas, provide new
information about child witnesses' abilities and raise new legal is-
sues and problems not previously examined in the literature (such
as special issues relating to young children and the potential in-
fringement of certain constitutional rights of the defendant).
Due to heightened media attention, increased public aware-
ness of the problem of child sexual abuse since the early to mid-
1980's, and the recent dramatic rise in reported cases, more cases
enter the legal system today, particularly the criminal justice sys-
tem.3 These factors have led to a major law reform movement to
improve the handling of child sexual abuse cases. Wide dissemina-
tion of a publication entitled Recommendations for Improving Le-
gal Intervention in Intrafamily Child Sexual Abuse Cases ("Rec-
ommendations"), published in 1982 by the ABA Resource Center,
also has influenced the adoption of reforms throughout the coun-
try. Moreover, the ABA's Criminal Justice Section proposed a set
of guidelines entitled Guidelines for the Fair Treatment of Child
Witnesses in Cases Where Child Abuse is Alleged, which were
passed by the ABA's House of Delegates in 1985.5 These guidelines
now represent official ABA policy on making the legal system more
sensitive to child abuse victims and should also lead to further law
reform efforts.
The Recommendations of the ABA Resource Center offer sug-
gestions for modifying state laws and local procedures. They ad-
dress three major problems in the legal system including the emo-
tional harm that the legal system causes child victims, the extreme
difficulty of proving the crime of sexual abuse of a child, and the
lack of appropriate treatment dispositions in criminal proceedings,
especially for intra-family offenders. The Recommendations in-
clude suggestions for legislative reform in the following areas: (1)
evidence reforms, such as special hearsay exceptions for childrens'
out-of-court statements of abuse, elimination of competency tests
3. For example, in Montgomery County, Maryland, the number of cases filed in the
first half of 1985 was the same number as that filed in all of 1984. Durcanin, Sex Abuse
Conviction Rate Drops in County, The Montgomery J., June 20, 1985, col. 1 at 1. See Roe,
infra p. 97 (Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 40 U. MIAMI L Rzv. 97 (1985)).
4. See RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2.
5. For the text of the guidelines, see Graham, infra p. 19 n. 37 (Indicia of Reliability
and Face to Face Confrontation: Emerging Issues in Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 40
U. MIAMI L. REv. 19 (1985)).
6. See RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 6-16.
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for child witnesses, abolition of the marital privilege and the cor-
roboration requirement; (2) legislative authority for a court's issu-
ance of protective orders in any judicial proceeding (for example,
to order the offender out of the home); (3) reform of laws relating
to judicial proceedings involving the non-abusive parent; and (4)
where necessary to prevent trauma, methods to avoid childrens'
testimony at grand jury, preliminary hearings, and trials, that will
not violate the defendant's constitutional rights (for example, vide-
otaping, or closed-circuit television of a child's testimony, or clos-
ing the courtroom during the child's testimony).7
By 1985, just three years after the ABA published these re-
form suggestions, many states had adopted legislation designed to
reduce trauma to children and to improve the rate of successful
legal outcomes. To illustrate, the last three jurisdictions to retain a
corroboration requirement in child sexual offense crimes in 1981,
eliminated the requirement by 1985. 8 In 1982, only two states had
special statutory hearsay exceptions (Kansas and Washington),
whereas eighteen states had adopted such exceptions by October,
1985.' Four states had legislation for videotaping a child's testi-
mony in 1981, whereas by October of 1985, at least twenty five
states provided for videotaping a child's testimony (by deposition
or at preliminary hearing for use at trial, preliminary hearing, or
grand jury) and sixteen states provided for closed circuit television
of children's testimony at trial."0 By early 1985, nearly half the
7. Id. at 30-40.
8. New York, Nebraska, and the District of Columbia were the last three jurisdictions
to require corroboration in all child sex offense cases. See Lloyd, The Corroboration of Sex-
ual Victimization of Children in AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, CHILD SEXuAL ASUSE AND THE
LAW 103, 106 (J. Bulkley ed. 1981).
9. The following special hearsay exception statutes known to the author are: Alaska:
ALASKA STAT. § 12.40.110 (1985); Arizona: ARIz. Rzv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1416 (1985); Arkan-
sas: ARi. R EVID. 803(25)(A); Colorado: CLO. REv. STAT. § 18-3-411(3) (1984); Florida:
Act of May 30, 1985, ch. 85-83, § 90.803(23), Fla. Laws 140, 141-42; Illinois: Ill. 83rd Gen.
Assem. P.A. 83-1067 § 115-10; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 704-6(4)(c) (Smith-Hurd 1985); In-
diana: IND. CODE § 35-37-4-6 (1985); Iowa: IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.96(6) (1985) (juvenile
court only); Kansas: KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-460(dd) (1983); Minnesota: MINN. STAT. §
595.02(3) (1985); Missouri: H.R. 366, § 491.075, 83rd Gen. Assembly, 1st Sess., 1985 Mo.
Legis. Service 20, 60; Nevada: Nav. Rzv. STAT. J 48 (1985) (cases only); Rhode Island:
R.I. GEN. LAws § 14-1-69 (1985) (custody or parental termination cases only); South Da-
kota: S.D. CODIrmD LAWS ANN. 1 19-16-38 (1985); Texas: Tax. CnMs. PROC. CODE ANN. §
38.072 (Vernon 1985); Tax. FAIL CODE ANN. § 54.03 (Vernon 1985); Utah: UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 77-35-15.5 (1985); Vermont: VT. R. EVID. 807(a); Washington: WASH. Rav. CODE §
9A.44.120 (1985). See also Bulkley, Evidentiary and Procedural Trends in State Legisla-
tion and Other Emerging Legal Issues in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 89 DICK. L. REV. 645
(1985).
10. States continue to enact new legislation in this area so this figure may not be accu-
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states had adopted rule 601 of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
which establishes a presumption of competency for all persons,"
only a dozen states had adopted this rule by 1981.
The Recommendations of the ABA Resource Center include a
wide range of suggestions for modifying local procedures to make
the legal system more sensitive to children. The suggestions in-
rate at the time of publication. The states presently known to have legislation on videotaped
testimony include the following: Alabama: 1985 Ala. Acts No. 85-743; Alaska: ALASKA
STAT. § 12.45.047 (1984); Arizona: ARMz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4235 (1985); Arkansas: ARK.
STAT. ANN. §§ 43-2035 to 2037 (1985); California: CAL. PENAL CODE § 1346 (West 1985);
Colorado: COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-413 (1984); Connecticut: 1985 Conn. Acts 85-587 Jan.
Sess.; Delaware: Di.. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 3511 (1985); Florida: FLA. STAT. § 90.90 (West
1984); Act of May 30, 1985, ch. 85-53, § 92.53, Fla. Laws 140, 146 (redesignated from §
90.90); Kansas: Kan. S.B. No. 107, 1985 Regular Session; Kentucky: Ky. REV. STAT. §
421.350 (1984); Maine: ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1205 (1985); Missouri: H.R. 366,
83rd Gen. Assembly, 1st Seass., 1985 Mo. Legis. Service 20, 61-69 (Vernon); Montana:
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-15-401 to 403 (1977); Nevada: Act of June 3, 1985, ch. 462, 1985
Nev. Stat. 1423; New Hampshire: N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 517:13-a (1985); New Mexico:
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-17 (1984); New York: N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 190.32 (Consol.
1984); Oklahoma: OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 753 (West 1984); Rhode Island: R.I. Gen.
Laws § 11-37-13.1 (1985); South Dakota: S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-12-9 (1985);
Texas: TEx. CRIM. PRoc. CODE ANN. § 38.071 (Vernon 1985); Utah: UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-
35-15.5 (1985); Vermont: VT. R. EVID. 807; Wisconsin: WIs. STAT. § 967.04(7) (1985).
The statutes dealing with closed circuit televsion testimony include the following: Ala-
bama: 1985 Ala. Acts. 85-743; California: CAL. PENAL CODE § 1347 (West 1985); Con-
necticut: 1985 Conn. Acts 85-587 Jan. Sess.; Florida: FLA. STAT. § 92.54 (1985); Hawaii:
HAWAII REV. STAT. § 626(d) (1985); Kansas: Kan. S.B. No. 107, 1985 Regular Session; Ken-
tucky: Ky. REV. STAT. § 421.350 (1984); Louisiana: LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 15:283 (West
1984); Maryland: MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-102 (1985); New Jersey: 1985
N.J. Seass. Law Serv. ch. 126 (West); New York: N.Y. CRIM. PROc. LAW §§ 65.00 to 65.30
(1985); Oklahoma: OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 753 (West 1984); Rhode Island: R.I. GEN. §
14-1-69 (1985); Texas: TEx. CaIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 38.071 (Vernon 1983); Utah: UTAH
CODE ANN. § 77-35-15.5 (1985); and Vermont: VT. R. EvID. 807(e) (1985). Since March,
1985, the number of new states that have passed closed circuit television or videotaping
legislation has more than doubled.'
11. Bulkley, Evidentiary and Procedural Trends, supra note 9, at 645, 668; Whitcomb,
Shapiro & Stellwagen, supra note 2, at 27-29, 31-32. The statutes which set up the presump-
tion of competency include the following as of August, 1985: Arizona: ARz. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 12-2202 (1985); Arkansas: ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-1001 (1975); Colorado: COLO. REV.
STAT. § 13-90-106(1)(b); Connecticut: 1985 Conn. Acts 85-587 (Jan. Sess.); Delaware:
DEL. R. EviD. 601; Florida: FLA. STAT. § 90.601 (1978); Maine: ME. R. EviD. 601 (1976);
Maryland: MD. CTS. & Jun. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-101, 9-103 (1985); Michigan: MICH.
STAT. ANN. § 27A.2163 (1985); Mississippi: MIss. CODE ANN. § 13-1-3 (1972); Missouri:
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 491.060(2) (Vernon 1985); Nebraska: NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-601 (1979);
New Jersey: N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:81-1 (1976); New Mexico: N.M. R. EvID. 601 (1985);
North Dakota: N.D. R. EVID. 601 (1985); Oklahoma: OKLA. STAT. ANN. Civ. Proc. 12, §
12-2601 (West 1980); Oregon: OR. REV. STAT. § 40.310 (1983); Pennsylvania: 42 PA. CON&
STAT. ANN. § 5911 (Purdon 1982); South Dakota: S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 19-12-1
(1985); Tennessee: TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-101 (1985); Utah: UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-24-2
(1985); Washington: WASH. REV. CODE § 5.60.050 (1985); Wisconsin: Wis. STAT. § 906.01
(1975); Wyoming: Wo. STAT. § 1-138 (1985).
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clude: (1) use of interdisciplinary teams; (2) coordination of juve-
nile and criminal court proceedings; (3) provision of special advo-
cates or guardian ad litems for children in criminal and juvenile
courts; (4) preventing repeated interviews of the children by using
joint interviews or one interview with a designated person, or vide-
otaping the interview, and providing special interviewing rooms;
and (5) establishing special sexual abuse prosecution units, and as-
signing the same prosecutor to all stages of the case (vertical
prosecution).
12
In recent years, some of the local policy or procedural changes
recommended by the ABA Resource Center have either been
adopted or are being considered at the local level. According to the
ABA's Child Sexual Abuse Law Reform Project, many jurisdictions
now videotape interviews with children and use other methods to
reduce the number of interviews. Some state prosecutors have es-
tablished a vertical prosecution policy, others have created special
child abuse or sexual offense units.3 Many jurisdictions have es-
tablished multidisciplinary teams, with professionals that receive
training on child sexual abuse issues.1 Victim advocates are often
appointed to work with the children during criminal proceedings."
These and other procedural changes have been made without the
12. See RaCOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 11.
13. Vertical prosecution involves appointment of one prosecutor for all stages of a case.
Although no current survey of state prosecutor policies exists, anecdotal information re-
ceived by the American Bar Association suggests that these changes are occurring. See IN-
NOVATIONS, 8upra note 2.
14. In addition, the Federal Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act requires coop-
eration among courts, law enforcement and social service agencies and training of personnel
as a condition of receiving federal funds. Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 5101-5116g (1985). All but a few states have been deemed eligible for this funding.
Some state statutes require or authorize the establishment of multi-disciplinary teams. See,
e.g., Florida: FLA. STAT. ANN. § 822.07(10)(c) (1981); Indiana: IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-11-14
(1980); Minnesota: MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.558 (West Supp. 1983); Montana: MONT. CODE
ANN. § 41-3-100 (1981); Virginia: V. CODE § 63.1-248-6 (1980).
Moreover, local, state, regional and national conferences on child sexual abuse or child
abuse are frequently held throughout the country, often with hundreds of participants. The
Third National Conference on Sexual Victimization of Children, sponsored by the Chil-
dren's Hospital in Washington, D.C. in the spring of 1984, had over one thousand partici-
pants. They expect from 2,000-3,000 attendees at their fourth conference in the spring of
1986 in New Orleans.
15. Jurisdictions which require appointment of victim advocates include Annapolis,
Maryland; Cambridge, Massachusetts; Seattle, Washington. See also INNOVATIONS, supra
note 2, at 2 (Based on survey findings, almost every prosecutor works with a victim/witness
assistance program or social services agency to assist the child through the court process.
Most jurisdictions reported that there is a social services or victim assistance program
outside of the prosecutor's office with which the prosecutor works closely on child sexual
abuse cases.)
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necessity of state legislation.
Several articles in this issue describe the non-legislative
changes that have occurred." Some commentators believe that the
child victim can be supported during criminal proceedings without
the need for drastic alternatives such as videotaping or closed-cir-
cuit television.1 7 One researcher points out that the trial experience
may cause little trauma if pre-trial support is provided.'6 Children,
like adults, react differently to the aftermath of the judicial pro-
cess.19 Indeed, some child sexual abuse experts believe that when
the child is supported, testifying in court may have a therapeutic
effect for some children.10 Researchers have called for empirically
based research studies to determine the actual emotional and psy-
chological effects of legal intervention on child victims and to de-
termine the special vulnerabilities of particular victims, as well as
the effectiveness of legal reforms."' The United States government
has recently provided federal funding for such research projects.22
The need for and scope of special approaches would be more cer-
tain if empirical data showed how children actually react to spe-
cific legal procedures.2
16. See Berliner, infra p. 167, (The Child Witness: The Progress and Emerging Limi-
tations, 40 U. MIAMI L. REv. 167 (1985)); Cramer, infra p. 209, (The District Attorney as a
Mobilizer in a Community Approach to Child Sexual Abuse, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 209
(1985)); Roe, infra p. 97 (Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 40 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 97 (1985)). See also INNOVATIONS, supra note 2 (description of twelve community pro-
grams that have developed coordinated, special approaches in child sexual abuse cases).
17. See Paper presented by Debbie Whitcomb, Assisting Child Victims in the Courts:
The Practical Side of Legislative Reform, 1985 American Bar Association, National Policy
Conference on Legal Reforms in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, Wash., D.C. (March 8-9, 1985).
18. Melton, Child Witnesses and the First Amendment: A Psycholegal Dilemma, 40:2
J. Soc. IssuEs 109, 116 (1984).
19. Berliner & Barbieri, The Testimony of the Child Victim of Sexual Assault, 40:2 J.
Soc. IssuEs 125, 135 (1984); Libai, supra note 2, at 1015.
20. Berliner & Barbieri, supra note 19, at 135.
21. Melton, supra note 18, at 116-21.
22. For example, the National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect, in the United States
Department of Health and Human Services, has recently funded large research projects on
the effects of legal intervention for children. Program Announcement 50 Fed. Reg. 25,860
(1985). Other agencies are also funding such research projects.
23. CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE, supra note 2; V. DE FRANCIS, PROTECTING THE CHILD VICTIM
OF SEX CRIMES (1969)( American Humane Association); Berliner & Stevens, Advocating for
Sexually Abused Children in the Criminal Justice System, in SExUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN:
SELECTED READINGS 47 (1980)(National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect, United States
Department of Health and Human Services); MacFarlane, Sexual Abuse of Children, in
THE VICTIMIZATION OF WOMEN 81 (J. Chapman & M. Gates eds. 1978); Sgroi, Introduction:
A National Needs Assessment for Protecting Child Victims of Sexual Assault, in SEXUAL




Nevertheless, although empirical research should be en-
couraged, it is clear from many who have worked closely with child
victims that children often suffer trauma from insensitive legal
procedures. Morever, if as the Supreme Court of the United States
noted in Globe Newspaper, it can be shown on a case by case basis
that a particular child would suffer harm, special procedures would
seem to be justified. From a social policy perspective, however, the
issue may not be whether a child may be traumatized by the legal
process, but whether children experience more severe emotional re-
actions than the average adult24 in order to justify special proce-
dures or laws. Indeed, alternatives similar to those advocated in
child sexual abuse cases have been utilized or sought in cases in-
volving other crimes, such as adult rape and kidnapping. For ex-
ample, South Carolina has statutes allowing videotaped deposi-
tions for the testimony of adult rape victims. Courts also have
admitted the former testimony of adult rape victims and child sex-
ual offense victims in lieu of live trial testimony where the court
found that testifying at trial would seriously jeopardize the health
of the victim."5 Further, many state statutes give courts discretion
to close the courtroom, when necessary, to prevent emotional
trauma to rape victims during their testimony. Finally, in a case
that has become important in the child sexual abuse area, in
United States v. Benfield,'7 the Eighth Circuit addressed the issue
of whether to admit videotaped testimony of a female kidnapping
victim." The court disallowed videotaped deposition because it
was made outside the defendant's presence."
As a matter of social policy, it might be argued that protective
legislation should apply to any crime victim who can show that
without it, he or she would be severely traumatized by the legal
process. As noted earlier, without research showing that children
are more sensitive to trauma than other crime victims, it could be
argued that they should not receive special legislative or govern-
24. Melton, Child Witnesses and the First Amendment, supra note 18. Melton states
that "there is also reason to believe that children's responses might be less severe on the
average than are adult's." d. at 116 (emphasis added).
25. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-28-20, 16-3-660, 16-3-670 (Law. Co-op. 1976); People v.
Gomez, 26 Cal. App. 3d 225, 103 Cal. Rptr. 80 (1972); Warren v. United States, 436 A.2d 821
(App. D.C. 1981).
26. For a list of such provisions, see J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS OP COMMON LAW §
1835 (1976).
27. 593 F.2d 815 (Sth Cir. 1979).
28. Id. at 817.
29. Id. at 821.
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mental attention. A recent study of elderly crime victims showed
that, contrary to popular belief, elderly victims recover from their
victimization better than other crime victims.30
Many of the articles in this issue point out that reforms may
have potentially harmful consequences. 3 1 When practitioners and
scholars first identified the problems with the legal system's han-
dling of child sexual abuse cases and suggested reforms, these early
suggestions generally were not subject to close scrutiny or analysis.
Even with relatively uncontroversial issues, such as the need to
abolish the corroboration requirement, scholars and others later
discovered unforeseen problems with the legal changes. For exam-
ple, at the ABA's National Policy Conference, some participants
pointed out that the corroboration requirement could be beneficial
because it made it possible to explain to parents why their child's
case could not be prosecuted. In the absence of such a require-
ment, the state may prosecute where the only evidence is the
child's testimony. A possible unfortunate consequence of abolition
of the requirement coupled with the increasing number of prosecu-
tions is that many cases which previously were not prosecuted due
to lack of corroboration may now result in acquittals.32
Another area of reform with substantial support is the move-
ment to abolish competency tests for children and to replace it
with a presumption of competency.33 Some participants at the Na-
30. K. FRIEDMAN, H. BISCHOF, R. DAVIS & A. PERSON, VICTIMS AND HELPERS: REACTIONS
TO CRIME (1982) (National Institute of Justice, United States Department of Justice); J.
HERNON & B. FORST, THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE TO VICTIM HARM (1984) (National
Institute of Justice, United States Department of Justice).
31. See Graham, infra p. 19 (Indicia of Reliability and Face to Face Confrontation:
Emerging Issues in Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 40 U. MIAMI L. Rv. 19 (1985) (defen-
dants rights may be impinged when exceptions to rules of evidence are too liberally ex-
tended)); MacFarlane, infra p. 135 (Diagnostic Evaluations and The Use of Videotapes in
Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 135 (1985) (videotaped interviews reduce
trauma but may impeach the child)); Mylniec & Dally, infra p. 115 (See No Evil? Can Insu-
lation of Child Sexual Abuse Victims Be Accomplished Without Endangering The Defen-
dant's Constitutional Rights?, 40 U. MIAMI L. REv. 115 (1985) (defendant's rights may be
impinged when victim not face-to-face with defendant when testifying)); Roe, infra p. 97
(Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 40 U. MIAMI L RV. 97 (1985) (expert
testimony can turn trial into battle of experts)); Comment, infra p. 217 (Other Crimes Evi-
dence to Prove the Corpus Delicti of a Child Sexual Oflense, 40 U. MIAMI L REV. 217 (1985)
(unrestricted admission of other crimes evidence would be prejudicial to defendants)).
32. See supra note 3.
33. See. McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 62 (3rd ed. 1984); J. WIGMoRE. EvmNcE IN TRIALS
OF COMMON LAW § 509 (1940); RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 30; Melton, Bulkley &
Wulkan, Competency of Children as Witnesses, in AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, CHILD SEX-
UAL ABUSE AND THE LAW 134 (J. Bulkley, ed.); see also Melton, Children's Competency to
Testify, 5 LAW & Hum. BEHAVIOR 73 (1981). Deans Wigmore and McCormick long have
[Vol. 40:5
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tional Policy Conference pointed out that a competency hearing
could be beneficial for other reasons. For example, it could show
that the child is a good witness or provide the child with a sense of
confidence so that he or she might become a better witness at trial.
Further, if the judge specifically determines that the child is com-
petent, this determination may encourage the judge or jury to be-
lieve that the child is also a credible witness. Finally, as with abol-
ishing the corroboration requirement, abolishing competency
requirements may lead to an increase in the number of cases that
are prosecuted, especially those involving two, three and four year
old witnesses. Unfortunately, there is a risk that even if the court
assumes that these children are competent, the jury may still ac-
quit the defendant if they do not perceive the child as a credible
witness.
Other areas addressed in this issue, such as videotaped inter-
views, 4 expert testimony, 5 and videotaping or televising a child's
testimony,36 raise problems as well as provide solutions. Admission
of expert testimony on the characteristics of the victim or offender,
or on the credibility of the child witness raise problems. Some psy-
chologists recommend that expert testimony should not be admit-
ted for these purposes. One psychologist contends that experts
should not be permitted to conclude, while being questioned, that
a victim exhibits the characteristics of the "sexually abused child
syndrome" and therefore have been sexually abused.37 The psy-
chologist argues that this conclusion is not reasonable because not
all victims possess such characteristics, and many persons who do
possess them have not been abused, but instead may be suffering
argued that children of any age should be allowed to testify without prior qualification.
Dean McCormick notes that "the remedy of excluding such a witness, who may be the only
person who knows the facts, seems inept and primitive." McCoRMICK, supra. § 62, at 156.
See also Comment, infra p. 245 (The Competency Requirement for the Child Victim of
Sexual Abuse: Must We Abandon it?), 40 U. MIAMi L. RzV. 245 (1985)).
34. MacFarlane, infra p. 135 (Diagnostic Evaluations and the Use of Videotapes in
Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 40 U. MIAM L Rzv. 135 (1985)).
35. Roe, infra p. 97 (Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 40 U. MIAMI L
Rav. 97 (1985)).
36. Mylniec & Dally, infra p. 115 (See No Evil? Can Insulation of Child Sexual Abuse
Victims Be Accomplished Without Endangering the Defendant's Constitutional Rights?, 40
U. MIAMI L REv. 115 (1985)).
37. Presentation by Gary Melton, Establishing Children's Competency and Credibility
to Stand Trial, National Institute on Child Sexual Abuse Victims, National Council of Ju-
venile and Family Court Judges, Kansas City, Missouri (Aug. 18-21, 1985) (Director, Law-
Psychology Program, University of Nebraska); accord Roe, infra p. 97 (Expert Testimony in
Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 40 U. MIAMI L. REv. 97 (1985)).
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from other psychological problems.3
When prosecutors use this type of evidence to show that a
child was abused, defense lawyers may also put on mental health
experts to say that the child could not have been abused because
the child does not have the characteristics of the sexually abused
child syndrome. The Child Sexual Abuse Law Reform Project re-
cently learned of cases in which the defense has used such experts.
As noted in this issue, expert testimony on offender characteristics
is even more problematic.3 ' Aside from its legal inadmissibility as
character evidence (evidence showing the defendant possesses cer-
tain characteristics common to sex offenders), it raises serious
questions about whether it is statistically probable that an individ-
ual with certain characteristics is likely to be a sexual offender. 0
The delicate nature and balance of the trial process must also
be considered when suggesting alternatives to a child's testimony
in open court, or when admitting a child's out-of-court statement
of abuse under a special hearsay exception. 1 According to McCor-
mick, "In order to encourage witnesses to put forth their best ef-
forts and to expose inaccuracies . . . [in perception, memory and
narration], the Anglo-American tradition evolved three conditions
under which witnesses ordinarily will be required to testify: oath,
personal presence at the trial and cross-examination." 2 The due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment, in addition to the
specific constitutional rights guaranteed to all defendants in crimi-
nal trials (for example, sixth amendment right to jury and public
trial, right to be confronted with witnesses, and right to compul-
sory process) protects defendants in these cases. The due process
clause accords a presumption of innocence to persons accused of
crimes. The state has the burden of proving the defendant's guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. In addition, the defendant has the
right to a fair trial, which includes the right to demand proof by
reliable, trustworthy evidence. For this reason, the criminal courts
adhere strictly to the rules of evidence in criminal courts, particu-
larly the rule against admitting hearsay.
Another possible due process issue arises when the defendant
38. Presentation by Gary Melton supra note 37.
39. See Roe, infra p. 97 (Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 40 U. MIAM
L. REv. 97 (1985)).
10. See Hall v. State, 692 S.W.2d 769 (Ark. Ct. App. 1985); State v. Maule, 35 Wash.
App. 287, 667 P.2d 96, (1983). See also Roe, supra note 35 at 97.
41. See Graham, infra p. 19 (Indicia of Reliability and Face to Face Confrontation:
Emerging Issues in Child Sexual Abuse Prosecution, 40 U. Mumi L. Rzv. 19 (1985)).
42. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 245, at 726-27 (1984).
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represents himself and the court permits the child to testify by
closed-circuit television or videotaping.'8 In addition to the prob-
lem created for defendants who exercise their constitutional right
to assistance from counsel and thereby forego the right of confron-
tation, it may be argued that it is discriminatory and violates due
process to limit the defendant's presence only when the defendant
is represented by counsel."
With respect to other constitutional rights, defendants often
claim their right of confrontation is violated when the prosecution
uses closed-circuit television, videotaped depositions or other
methods that prevent the child from having to see the defendant
while testifying. One debate at the National Policy Conference
touched on the issue of the effect of the televised testimony on the
jury, and whether it diminished or enhanced the witness' credibil-
ity.45 These procedures may violate the defendant's right to a jury
or public trial, if, for example, evidence is distorted or not fully
conveyed (especially the witness' demeanor) to the jury.46 Other
authors have suggested that a suitable "child courtroom" should
be constructed. 7
In terms of confrontation, two authors in this publication,
other commentators and some courts believe that the reliability re-
quirement of the confrontation right will be satisfied without the
defendant's presence, if the child has been cross-examined under
oath and if the jury has had an opportunity to view the child's
demeanor." In contrast, other courts and commentators suggest
43. See Mylniec & Dally, infra p. 115 (See No Evil? Can Insulation of Child Sexual
Abuse Victims Be Accomplished Without Endangering the Defendant's Constitutional
Rights? 40 U. MIAmI L. RaV. 115 (1985)).
44.Id.
45. Paper presented by Josephine Bulkley, Summary of Conference Papers and Dis-
cushion, 1985 American Bar Association, National Policy Conference on Legal Reforms in
Child Sexual Abuse Cases, Wash., D.C. (Mar. 8-9, 1985).
46. Hocheheiser v. Superior Court, 161 Cal. App. 3d 777, 208 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1984);
Brakel, Videotape in Trial Proceedings: A Technological Obsession?, 61 A.B.A. J. 956
(1975); Doret, Trial By Videotape-Can Justice Be Seen To Be Done?, 47 TEMP. L.Q. 228
(1974); Comment, The Criminal Videotape Trial: Serious Constitutional Questions, 55 O.
L REV. 567 (1976).
47. Comment, Libai's Child Courtroom: Is It Constitutional?, 7 JUv. L. 31 (1983).
48. Graham, infra p. 19 (Indicia of Reliability and Face to Face Confrontation Emerg-
ing Issues in Child Sexual Abuse Projections, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 19 (1985)); Mlyniec &
Dally, infra p. 115 (See No Evil? Can Insulation of Child Sexual Abuse Victims Be Accom-
plished Without Endangering the Defendant's Constitutional Rights?, 40 U. MIAMi L. REV.
115 (1985)). See also State v. Strable, 313 N.W.2d 497 (Iowa 1981); State v. Sheppard, 197
N.J. Super. 411, 484 A.2d 1330 (1984); 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §
1396 (1974). Dean Wigmore states, "If there has been a cross-examination, there has been a
confrontation." Id. at 154. He also states that requiring the personal appearance of the wit-
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that the right of confrontation is satisfied only if the child and de-
fendant can see and hear each other.4 ' The traditional hearsay ex-
ception for former testimony or depositions has three require-
ments: (1) unavailability of the witness at the time of the trial; (2)
cross-examination of the witness; and (3) presence of the defen-
dant.50 If this issue reaches the Supreme Court of the United
States, the Court may require the defendant's presence, in addi-
tion to unavailability and reliability, in order to admit pre-re-
corded videotaped testimony or testimony by closed-circuit televi-
sion of a child victim. In support of a defendant's constitutional
right to self-representation has stated:
The sixth amendment does not provide merely that a de-
fense shall be made for the accused; it grants the accused per-
sonally the right to make his defense. It is the accused, not
counsel, who must be 'informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation,' who must be 'confronted with witnesses against
him,' and who must be 'accorded compulsory process for ob-
taining witnesses in his favor.'"
In most reform areas, it appears that the benefits outweigh the
detriments. Perhaps even with positive changes, one may expect
some negative aspects. If controversial reforms are applied on a
case-by-case basis, many of the problems may not exist. For exam-
ple, some have contended that if the child is intimidated by the
defendant, the child may find it more difficult to videotape a depo-
ness does not mean the opponent and witness must confront each other, but that the wit-
ness must be present before the tribunal. Id.
At least 20 videotaping and closed circuit televison statutes either authorize or require
that the defendant be excluded, or do not allow the child to see the defendant, but provide
for jury viewing of the testimony and cross-examination of the child. For the citations to
these statutes, see supra note 10. The following states have statutes regarding videotaped
testimony or closed circuit television of a child victim's testimony which state that the de-
fendant may or must be hidden from the child's view: Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Kan-
sas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Missouri, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Ver-
mont (only for closed circuit television testimony, defendant is present during videotaped
testimony), and Texas. Id. A few states have statutes that say nothing about the defendant's
presence, including Nevada, Maine, and Utah. The Wisconsin statute states that the judge
must decide who is present, the defendant is not mentioned at all. I, Kentucky and Texas,
however, two courts have held that videotaping and television statutes violate the confronta-
tion clause. Commonwealth v. Willis, No. 84 CR 346 (Ky. Cir. Ct. Feb. 20, 1985); Poweil v.
Slater, No. 05-84-00646-CR (Ct. App. TeL 5th Dist. May 28, 1985).
49. See, e.g., United States v. Benfield, 593 F.2d 815, 821-22 (8th Cir. 1979); Common-
wealth v. Willis, No. 84 CR 346 (Ky. Cir. Ct. Feb. 20, 1985); Kansas City v. McCoy, 526
S.W.2d 336 (Mo. 1975); Powell v. Slater, No. 05-84-00646-CR (Ct. App. Tex. 5th Dist. May
28, 1985); Bulkley, Evidentiary and Procedural Trends, supra note 9, at 651-52.
50. See supra note 33, § 253, at 753-58.
51. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 (1975).
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sition in the presence of the defendant, pursuant to some state leg-
islation, than to testify in a courtroom.' A videotaped deposition
may be proper, however, if the child is likely to suffer serious psy-
chological harm from testifying at trial in front of the jury, judge,
and public, or where the courtroom setting would be so intimidat-
ing as to render the child unable to communicate. 8 As noted ear-
lier, when a particular approach raises possible violations of consti-
tutional rights, the court should decide on a case-by-case basis
whether the approach is necessary because of harm to a particular
victim.
Although this journal tackles many of the key legal problems
in child sexual abuse cases, it leaves other areas for future explora-
tion. For example, civil tort litigation is rapidly gaining popularity
as a remedy for child sexual abuse." In those cases, plaintiffs range
from multiple victims of abuse by school personnel, day care teach-
ers, and priests, to adult victims of incest. These new actions raise
many problems for commentators to examine, including deposition
of victims, parental immunity,'s statutes of limitation," insurance
company coverage, increased costs, and lengthy litigation.
6 7
Another area of concern involves sexual abuse allegations in
divorce and custody actions. Experts believe, in part due to the
increased awareness of the problem of child abuse, that a vindic-
tive parent could influence his or her child to falsely accuse the
other parent." Others believe that dome stic relations courts often
ignore valid sexual abuse complaints made by children. Domestic
relations courts need to be educated about the dynamics of child
sexual abuse. Furthermore, there are issues concerning jurisdiction
of and coordination between the juvenile and domestic relations
courts that need to be examined and resolved. Indeed, a federal
grant was recently jointly awarded to the American Bar Associa-
52. Whitcomb, supra note 17, at 19.
53. See MacFarlane, infra p. 135 (Diagnostic Evaluation$ and the Use of Videotapes
in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 40 U. MLui L Rav. 135 (1985)).
54. Salten, Statutes of Limitations in Civil Incest Suits: Preserving the Victim's Rem-
edy, 7 HAzv. WomzN's LJ. 189 (1984); Sawyer, Priest's Child-Molestation Case Traumau-
tizes Catholic Community, Washington Post, June 9, 1985, at A6, col. 1; Curry, Incest: The
Victim Fights Back, Some File Suits for Damages, L.A. Times, May 21, 1982, at VI, col. 1.
55. Note, Parental Immunity Doctrine, 7 J. Juv. L. 267 (1983); Note, The Parent-Child
Immunity Doctrine, 5 J. Juv. L 75 (1981).
56. Salten, supra note 54, at 203.
57. The Youngest Witnesses, Newsweek, Feb. 18, 1985, at 72.
58. See, e.g., Paper presented by E. Benedek & D. Schetky, Allegations of Sexual
Abuse in Child Custody Cases, Annual Meeting of the American Academy of Psychiatry
and the Law, Nassau, Bahamas (Oct. 26, 1984).
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tion's National Legal Resource Center for Child Advocacy and
Protection and to the Association of Family and Conciliation
Courts for the development of educational materials for domestic
court judges and personnel who must resolve child sexual abuse
allegations.
Hopefully, this special issue of the University of Miami Law
Review will expose readers to new ways of thinking about how
changes in our legal system can accommodate the needs of child
victims who must be witnesses, while making efforts to preserve
the basic constitutional framework of our criminal justice system.
Because many of these issues are very new, they will not be settled
for some time to come. These issues cut across many substantive
areas of law and are heavily intertwined with other disciplines, es-
pecially the social sciences. For this reason, it is particularly diffi-
cult to establish a body of knowledge known as "child sexual abuse
law." Child sexual abuse cases, however, do present special
problems in our legal system and perhaps with more time and seri-
ous academic attention, some fundamental and generally accept-
able legal principles can be established.
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